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THE LIGHT WE SHINE INTO THE GREY: 
A RESTORATIVE #METOO SOLUTION AND 
AN ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THOSE 
#METOO LEAVES IN THE DARK 
Nora Stewart* 
 
In the past year and a half, American women have publicly discussed 
experiences of sexual assault, harassment, and—notably—grey-area 
misconduct in an unprecedented manner.  The rhetoric of the #MeToo 
movement is rife with references to “shining a light” on a set of unexplored 
issues hitherto obscured in cultural darkness, to following women’s 
experiences into the grey.  What is new about #MeToo, and what likely will 
be the through line that defines its historical importance, has been its 
sensitivity to nuance.  The grey range of #MeToo misconduct is not a new 
problem.  It is emphatically new, however, as a subject of public discourse.  
As such, and given the unsettled expectations that noncriminal #MeToo 
accusations have generated, it invites a new legal solution.  This Note 
proposes that solution in the form of a restorative justice response to grey-
area #MeToo misconduct, based on indigenous jurisprudential models. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“Bill Cosby is one thing; but many women don’t want the V.P. of sales 
who got too handsy at the Christmas party to be banished forever, let alone 
go to prison.”1  It is not only the internet that makes #MeToo different from 
prior movements.  Though the broader differences between feminism and 
#feminism could easily fill several volumes,2 a primary feature separating 
#MeToo from its predecessors is the conviction that women3 have a right to 
talk about the aforementioned V.P. of sales and be heard. 
Before #MeToo, the story of women and sexual misconduct centered on 
victimization, blame, belief, narrative, ambiguity, power—all with respect to 
a potential crime.  Though defining rape and sexual assault presents 
challenges, both legally and colloquially, those challenges previously 
concerned a known range of permissible accusations.  Tacitly, an allegation 
had to be serious and important enough for a victim to earn the cultural 
airtime necessary to tell her story.  Women understood that a certain 
threshold of violence or indignity perpetrated against them was a prerequisite 
to publicly discussing an allegation; the inevitable process of defending their 
credibility could only begin once their allegation met that initial bar and 
entered the public sphere. 
#MeToo has changed the rules surrounding women’s public discourse.  As 
distinct from historical feminist movements, it has rapidly become a way to 
 
 1. Katie J. M. Baker, What Do We Do with These Men?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/27/opinion/sunday/metoo-comebacks-charlie-rose.html 
[https://perma.cc/6WQQ-LJRG]. 
 2. #Feminism is used to describe both a class of activist hashtags created to draw 
attention to women’s issues and foster social media engagement, see, e.g., Jessica Bennett, 
Behold the Power of #Hashtag Feminism, TIME (Sept. 10, 2014), http://time.com/ 
3319081/whyistayed-hashtag-feminism-activism/ [https://perma.cc/RUN6-8B2T], and as a 
commentary on the irony or unseriousness of internet culture, occasionally with a nonetheless 
unironic and serious message about feminism itself, see, e.g., Last Week Tonight 
(@LastWeekTonight), TWITTER (Mar. 12, 2017, 8:02 PM), https://twitter.com/ 
lastweektonight/status/841122161045692416 [https://perma.cc/NK9N-LEHQ].  #MeToo is 
commonly referred to with the “#” symbol as part of the movement’s name, but in common 
parlance this hashtag generally does not connote irony in the way that the hashtag in 
#feminism sometimes does.  Presumably this is because the #MeToo hashtag highlights the 
movement’s online origins and serves as an embedded invitation to participate. 
 3. This Note conceives of #MeToo as a women’s movement for purposes of scope.  The 
words “women” and “female” as used here are intended to encompass both cisgender and 
transgender women.  While such experiences are not the focus of this Note, its delineated 
scope also is in no way intended to minimize the #MeToo movement’s application to men’s 
experiences as victims of sexual misconduct. 
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expose women’s realities beyond the confines of the previously acceptable.4  
In 2019, women are “expanding the boundaries of what kinds of stories must 
be taken seriously—and bringing a much fuller picture of female humanity 
into view.”5 
As women work to shine a light6 on subjects previously unfit for public 
airing, questions about consequences necessarily follow.  If the V.P. of 
sales’s “handsiness” is now fair game for public discussion and his behavior 
fit for public condemnation, what happens next—for him and for the 
unwilling recipient of his attentions?  If #MeToo’s legacy is to publicly 
problematize unacceptable behavior below the threshold of violence and 
indignity regulated by criminal sanctions, do extant legal models provide a 
means to adequately respond to that behavior without criminalizing it? 
Some recent cultural commentary has suggested that restorative justice 
models rooted in indigenous7 jurisprudence8 are worth exploring as a next 
phase of the #MeToo movement.9  This Note takes the position that 
restorative justice is a legal solution to a specific dimension of #MeToo, 
 
 4. See Rebecca Traister, When the Muzzle Comes Off, CUT (Sept. 24, 2018), 
https://www.thecut.com/2018/09/kavanaugh-sexual-assault-deborah-ramirez-christine-
ford.html [https://perma.cc/7JZY-UFNE] (“[W]hat I do know with absolute assurance is that 
we are living through a period in which women are enacting crucial, swift, large-scale social 
and political change.  That change is happening whether or not Republicans push Kavanaugh 
through [to the Supreme Court], whether or not Democrats take the House or the Senate.  The 
change is not simply (or perhaps, not yet) about outcomes, but rather about expectations and 
what it’s okay to talk about and when.”). 
 5. Id. 
 6. See, e.g., Chantal Da Silva, #MeToo Study Finds Nearly All Women and Almost Half 
of Men in U.S. Have Faced Sexual Harassment or Assault, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 22, 2018), 
https://www.newsweek.com/after-metoo-study-finds-nearly-all-women-and-almost-half-
men-us-have-815660 [https://perma.cc/6B57-33Q7]. 
 7. This Note uses the terms “Native American” and “indigenous” interchangeably when 
speaking about the experiences of tribal citizens living on reservations within the geographical 
boundaries of the United States.  It occasionally makes use of the word “Indian” when 
referring specifically to laws or legal contexts that employ that term (as in the phrase “Indian 
Law”) or to the titles or content of works that either reference those legal contexts or make 
use of the word “Indian” for their own rhetorical purposes.  When referring to the people or 
jurisprudence of a specific tribal community, this Note uses more specific language. 
 8. As it advocates the adaptation of that jurisprudence, this Note maintains an awareness 
of the people from whom it is borrowed.  In the period leading up to American women’s public 
exploration of their grey-area #MeToo experiences, the Department of Justice reported that 
more than one in two Native American and Alaska Native women had experienced sexual 
violence in their lifetimes. ANDRÉ B. ROSAY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, VIOLENCE AGAINST 
AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE WOMEN AND MEN:  2010 FINDINGS FROM THE 
NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY 13 (2016), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/249736.pdf [https://perma.cc/56U5-FGHF].  #MeToo 
does little for these women.  In comparison to their unambiguously violent experiences and 
the blind eye consistently turned to them, grey-area misconduct is not a pressing issue.  
#MeToo’s exposure of nuance is, however, a cultural breakthrough that ultimately will benefit 
all women if suitable consequences are developed.  This Note regards the grey range of 
#MeToo misconduct as an opportunity not only to develop an appropriate legal response to a 
newly public set of issues but also to expand the application of a successful and undervalued 
Native American legal model.  In so doing, it does not directly benefit Native American 
women.  It seeks nonetheless to amplify awareness of their experiences. 
 9. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 1. 
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namely, the part of the movement that spotlights ambiguous behavior beyond 
the purview of criminal sanctions. 
That limited context is essential to this Note’s proposed solution.  While 
others10 have seen a possible place for restorative justice across the full 
spectrum of behaviors pertinent to #MeToo—from those newly entering the 
sphere of public discourse to those unambiguously categorized as criminal—
this Note advocates its use for the “handsiness” end of the spectrum and 
emphatically not for the rape and sexual assault end.  Implicit in the offered 
solution is the maintenance of space both for victim-centering11 practices and 
to examine the cultural implications12 of the solution itself. 
With those parameters in mind, as this Note develops its proposed solution 
to #MeToo’s dearth of grey-area13 consequences, it is conscious of the 
experiences of the people from whose jurisprudence it borrows its solution 
and remains aware of the legal and practical predicament of Native American 
women with respect to sexual violence.  It is through the use of indigenous 
jurisprudence that this Note identifies a qualified way forward for #MeToo, 
but in so doing, it also intentionally identifies a group of people for whom 
#MeToo has done very little. 
This Note nonetheless is wary of the ways in which juxtaposing two forms 
of cultural silence—the previously unreported instances of grey-area bad 
behavior that #MeToo spotlights,14 viewed with reference to cultural and 
legal failures vis-à-vis Native American women15—risks creating a narrative 
of false equivalence, especially when such a juxtaposition is made by a white 
woman.  Where that juxtaposition is pertinent, this Note highlights the ways 
in which the two experiences are both valid and important but are 
unambiguously not the same.  In so doing, it strives to tackle issues of cultural 
appropriation head-on and bake questions about the right of white scholars 
to comment on the experience of Native American women into its structure. 
 
 10. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 11. Where possible in the context of rape and sexual violence, this Note prefers the term 
“survivor” to the term “victim.”  In legal contexts in which “victim” ordinarily is used (e.g., 
“victim-centering,” “victims’ rights,” and more general uses of “victim” that extend to areas 
of criminal law beyond the context of sexual violence) this Note uses “victim” instead of 
“survivor.”  It also uses “victim” in the context of sexual misconduct other than rape and 
sexual violence. 
 12. See infra Part II.A; see also infra Part III.B. 
 13. As used in this Note, the terms “grey-area” and “grey range” refer to nonassaultive 
physical contact or physical exposure, patterns of belittling pranks or comments, unwanted 
attentions, and behaviors taking place in a context of partially granted or unwillingly granted 
consent.  These terms seek to capture the noncriminal conduct that alters the course of 
women’s lives and careers subtly and on terms that women and men routinely accepted prior 
to #MeToo as the way things are. See infra Part I.A. 
 14. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 1. 
 15. See, e.g., Sarah Deer, Sovereignty of the Soul:  Exploring the Intersection of Rape Law 
Reform and Federal Indian Law, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 455, 460 (2005).  See generally 
Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Public Law 280 and the Problem of Lawlessness in California 
Indian Country, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1405 (1997) (fleshing out the connection between 
legislation and “lawlessness”). 
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While legal scholarship on the #MeToo movement is in its infancy, there 
is a large amount of cultural literature on the subject,16 and this Note relies 
on that literature where legal scholarship is lacking.  Moreover, there is 
significant legal scholarship relating to restorative justice’s theoretical 
dimensions but relatively little legal scholarship about the more practical 
dimensions of tribal models and follow-on models in nonindigenous settings.  
To explicate these practices, this Note relies in part on interviews with Eric 
Gross, who studied Navajo Peacemaking jurisprudence in situ.17  This Note’s 
contribution to existing literature stems from its concentration on the 
category of #MeToo wrongdoing to which restorative justice can offer a 
solution, noting where pertinent the dearth of overlap between Native 
American women’s experiences and the conditions that have made a 
restorative justice application to #MeToo possible. 
Part I of this Note sketches the origins and early aims of the #MeToo 
movement, with a focus on the new kinds of narratives that it has enabled 
women to bring into public discourse alongside more traditionally acceptable 
or “credible” accusations with a higher bar for damage to the survivor.  It 
then turns to the cultural backlash against #MeToo and the movement’s 
struggle to define a fair and workable set of consequences across the sexual 
misconduct spectrum.  Part II discusses the use of indigenous jurisprudence 
by nonindigenous people before laying out the legal framework for forms of 
restorative justice used in both tribal jurisprudences and legal models 
inspired by them.  Part III carefully posits a limited application of restorative 
justice to the grey category of behavior onto which #MeToo has shone the 
first public light.  It does so by advocating for a Peacemaking docket attached 
to state trial courts, which should be procedurally administered under the 
framework of an “Adjournment in Contemplation of Restoration.”  It then 
touches on what #MeToo, as well as this proposal, can and cannot do for 
Native American women. 
I.  WHOSE LIGHT IS IT ANYWAY? 
This Part examines the early history of #MeToo and its development from 
a movement catalyzed by the unambiguous predations of powerful men into 
one that also reckons with the ramifications of grey-area misconduct.  It 
catalogues some paradigmatic examples of the grey-area behavior of public 
figures:  Louis C.K., Al Franken, and Deborah Ramirez’s allegations against 
 
 16. Since consensus emerged that #MeToo is a movement of historical importance and 
not (as was initially assumed) a few days of Twitter traffic, journalists and essayists have 
devoted considerable space to analyzing its scope and implications. See, e.g., Baker, supra 
note 1; Da Silva, supra note 6; Rebecca Traister, Too Much, Too Soon, CUT (Aug. 28, 2018), 
https://www.thecut.com/2018/08/louis-c-k-and-matt-lauer-what-do-their-comebacks-
mean.html [https://perma.cc/ST75-D25X]. 
 17. Interview with Eric Gross, Recipient, Dep’t of Justice Fellowship Grant to Evaluate 
and Assess Navajo Peacemaking, in N.Y.C., N.Y. (Dec. 4, 2018) (notes on file with author) 
[hereinafter Interview 1 with Eric Gross]; Interview with Eric Gross, Recipient, Dep’t of 
Justice Fellowship Grant to Evaluate and Assess Navajo Peacemaking, in N.Y.C., N.Y. (Dec. 
20, 2018) (notes on file with author) [hereinafter Interview 2 with Eric Gross]. 
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Brett Kavanaugh.  It then turns to the cultural backlash against #MeToo in 
the context of the movement’s struggle to determine what comes next. 
A.  #MeToo History 
On October 15, 2017, in response to the growing scandal around film 
producer Harvey Weinstein’s decades of predatory behavior toward women, 
actress Alyssa Milano posted the tweet that began the 2017 incarnation18 of 
the #MeToo movement:  “If you’ve been sexually harassed or assaulted write 
‘me too’ as a reply to this tweet.”19 
The original New York Times story about Mr. Weinstein’s trail of 
misconduct, intimidation, and oppressively wielded power broke on October 
5, 2017.20  The story featured recollections of a hotel room ambush from 
actress Ashley Judd (it would later emerge that Mr. Weinstein worked to 
derail Ms. Judd’s career after the encounter described in the Times article21) 
alongside tepidly apologetic quotes provided to the Times by Mr. Weinstein, 
which implied that he expected the unwelcome publicity to die down 
quickly.22  It also catalogued various settlement payments and nondisclosure 
agreements that Mr. Weinstein and those representing him had engineered 
over the course of almost three decades.23  Perhaps most disturbingly, it 
detailed the strategies regularly employed by women in Mr. Weinstein’s orbit 
to avoid his unwanted advances as they attempted to get on with their careers:  
one woman advised a colleague to wear a parka in Mr. Weinstein’s presence, 
and female executives frequently “double[d] up” when attending meetings 
with Mr. Weinstein in order to mitigate the inevitable consequences of being 
alone with him.24 
 
 18. Me Too (as opposed to #MeToo) previously existed as a movement founded in 1997 
by Tarana Burke. Sandra E. Garcia, The Woman Who Created #MeToo Long Before Hashtags, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/20/us/me-too-movement-
tarana-burke.html [https://perma.cc/D7TP-XM8A] (detailing Ms. Burke’s initial worry that 
Ms. Milano would co-opt the #MeToo hashtag in the way that Ms. Burke had previously 
experienced white feminists to do with the initiatives of feminist women of color; as well as 
Ms. Milano’s subsequent assurances that she was initially unaware of Ms. Burke’s work, and 
her public and private attribution of #MeToo to Ms. Burke upon becoming aware of it). 
 19. Alyssa Milano (@Alyssa_Milano), TWITTER (Oct. 15, 2017, 1:21 PM), 
https://twitter.com/Alyssa_Milano/status/919659438700670976 [https://perma.cc/4SSW-
R4VJ]. 
 20. Jodi Kantor & Megan Twohey, Harvey Weinstein Paid Off Sexual Harassment 
Accusers for Decades, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/us/ 
harvey-weinstein-harassment-allegations.html [https://perma.cc/2CPX-8HLV]. 
 21. Rebecca Rubin, Ashley Judd, Mira Sorvino Respond to Peter Jackson’s Claims That 
Weinstein Blacklisted Them, VARIETY (Dec. 15, 2017), https://variety.com/2017/film/news/ 
ashley-judd-mira-sorvino-weinstein-blacklist-peter-jackson-1202642211/ [https://perma.cc/ 
35S6-BWFL]. 
 22. “I appreciate the way I’ve behaved with colleagues in the past has caused a lot of pain, 
and I sincerely apologize for it.  Though I’m trying to do better, I know I have a long way to 
go.” Kantor & Twohey, supra note 20. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
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Five days later, the New Yorker published an account of Mr. Weinstein’s 
behavior that was darker yet.25  This account was not only of prolonged, 
almost prosaic, abuses of power; or of coercion, fear, and shame (on the 
survivors’ end); but of rapes and assaults as well.26  The New Yorker article 
was the result of a ten-month investigation and featured interviews with 
thirteen women who said that Mr. Weinstein had harassed or assaulted 
them.27  It noted that various publications had made prior attempts to expose 
Mr. Weinstein’s abuses but that Mr. Weinstein and his associates had 
employed “nondisclosure agreements, payoffs, and legal threats” to ensure 
that those attempts consistently “fell short of the demands of journalistic 
evidence.”28 
The combined effect of the two stories was powerful.  Under ordinary 
circumstances, these articles and the strong but specific outrage that they 
spawned29 might have been the end of the conversation.  On October 13, 
2017, however, an opinion piece by actress Mayim Bialik appeared in the 
New York Times.30  In this piece, Ms. Bialik framed the “casting couch” 
encounters that her peers had experienced as connected, in some measure, to 
their failure to make “conservative choices” and “dress modestly.”31  She 
also characterized her own lack of firsthand experience with predatory 
industry giants in hotel rooms as the “upside of not being a ‘perfect ten.’”32 
The social media backlash was swift.33  Among the responses was a 
searing tweet on October 15, 2017, from actress Gabrielle Union:  
“Reminder.  I got raped at work at a Payless shoe store.  I had on a long tunic 
& leggings so miss me w/ ‘dress modestly’ shit.”34  Later that day, Alyssa 
 
 25. Ronan Farrow, From Aggressive Overtures to Sexual Assault:  Harvey Weinstein’s 
Accusers Tell Their Stories, NEW YORKER (Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/ 
news-desk/from-aggressive-overtures-to-sexual-assault-harvey-weinsteins-accusers-tell-
their-stories [https://perma.cc/AT8H-99VE]. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See, e.g., Monica Hesse & Dan Zak, Violence.  Threats.  Begging.  Harvey Weinstein’s 
30-Year Pattern of Abuse in Hollywood, WASH. POST (Oct. 14, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/violence-threats-begging-harvey-weinsteins-
30-year-pattern-of-abuse-in-hollywood/2017/10/14/2638b1fc-aeab-11e7-be94-
fabb0f1e9ffb_story.html [https://perma.cc/UH6S-378T]. 
 30. Mayim Bialik, Opinion, Being a Feminist in Harvey Weinstein’s World, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 13, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/13/opinion/mayim-bialik-feminist-harvey-
weinstein.html [https://perma.cc/W3YU-4HK3]. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See Elahe Izadi, Mayim Bialik Apologizes for Weinstein Op-Ed:  ‘I Am Truly Sorry 
for Causing So Much Pain,’ WASH. POST (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/arts-and-entertainment/wp/2017/10/15/mayim-bialik-fires-back-at-weinstein-op-ed-
critics-its-so-sad-how-vicious-people-are-being/ [https://perma.cc/JE63-CNVB]. 
 34. Gabrielle Union (@itsgabrielleu), TWITTER (Oct. 15, 2017, 9:28 AM), 
https://twitter.com/itsgabrielleu/status/919600825101705217 [https://perma.cc/9URQ-
RRDK].  This tweet, appearing earlier in the same day in which Alyssa Milano sent her 
#MeToo tweet, is notable for several reasons.  Everything about it—its milieu (Twitter), its 
reference to Payless (woman-of-the-people), its use of profanity (unpretentious)—stands in 
stark contrast to Ms. Bialik’s op-ed.  Where Ms. Bialik’s piece was othering, Ms. Union’s 
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Milano sent her #MeToo tweet, seemingly in reaction to Ms. Bialik as much 
as to Mr. Weinstein.35  By the following morning, nearly 40,000 people had 
replied.36  By the forty-eight-hour mark, users had posted the hashtag close 
to a million times on Twitter alone.37 
Perhaps because of the inclusive tone that premised Ms. Milano’s tweet,38 
or due to years of dormant frustration with Bialik-type responses to 
Weinstein-type horrors,39 or because of the nascent movement’s timing 
relative to broader cultural patterns,40 #MeToo went on to become something 
far beyond an internet campaign.41  One year after its inception, #MeToo was 
 
tweet is universalizing.  In describing the horrific experience of a beautiful actress, it makes 
abundantly clear in fewer than 140 characters that any woman could have been attacked as 
she was attacked.  Though it is difficult to pinpoint precisely what produced the longevity and 
breadth of the #MeToo movement, the quality of inclusiveness exemplified by this tweet and 
made explicit in the invitational Alyssa Milano tweet that followed it likely were contributing 
factors. 
 35. Heidi Stevens, #MeToo Campaign Proves Scope of Sexual Harassment, Flaw in 
Mayim Bialik’s Op-Ed, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 16, 2017, 11:15 AM), 
https://www.chicagotribune.com/lifestyles/stevens/ct-life-stevens-monday-me-too-mayim-
bialik-1016-story.html [https://perma.cc/3SNR-EPWQ].  It is possible that frustration with 
Ms. Bialik’s op-ed (and the broader cultural assumptions of which it was emblematic) was 
also a contributing factor in #MeToo’s strength and duration as a movement.  Mr. Weinstein’s 
decades of predation are truly appalling, but it is somewhat difficult to see why he—and not 
Roman Polanski or Woody Allen, for instance—produced a response that has amounted to a 
cultural shift.  The timing of Ms. Bialik’s op-ed might go some way toward explaining this 
distinction.  Tonally, the op-ed was a kind of synecdoche for the typical response that follows 
revelations of misconduct (inadequate horror, victim-blaming, exhortation that women adapt 
to their regrettable surroundings instead of seeking to alter them, negligible change), and 
#MeToo was born in part of a determination that the overall response to the Weinstein scandal 
would not be business as usual. 
 36. Id. 
 37. More Than 12M “Me Too” Facebook Posts, Comments, Reactions in 24 Hours, CBS 
NEWS (Oct. 17, 2017, 6:50 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/metoo-more-than-12-
million-facebook-posts-comments-reactions-24-hours/ [https://perma.cc/9RB8-GFFE]. 
 38. See id. (citing Ms. Milano’s premise that her campaign was constructed to demonstrate 
the magnitude of the issue by shifting the focus “away from the predator and to the victim”); 
see also supra note 34. 
 39. See supra note 35. 
 40. See Jeremy Diamond, Trump Says It’s ‘a Very Scary Time for Young Men in America,’ 
CNN (Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/02/politics/trump-scary-time-for-young-
men-metoo/index.html [https://perma.cc/LU58-5UEQ] (detailing the progression from the 
release of the Access Hollywood tape of Donald Trump—and the various subsequent 
accusations of sexual harassment and assault leveled against the then-candidate seemingly 
without effect—in October 2016, to the beginning of #MeToo in October 2017, to then- 
nominee Brett Kavanaugh’s fraught U.S. Supreme Court confirmation hearings in October 
2018).  It is also likely that legal developments over a longer arc in some sense prepared the 
way for the unprecedented features of #MeToo.  Broadly, the force requirement that once was 
a ubiquitous element of proving rape has in recent decades given way to more nuanced 
understandings of consent. See, e.g., Michelle J. Anderson, Reviving Resistance in Rape Law, 
1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 953, 959; Cassia C. Spohn, The Rape Reform Movement:  The Traditional 
Common Law and Rape Law Reforms, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 119, 120–21 (1999).  This legal shift, 
both statutory and common law, may well be among the forces making the cultural 
acknowledgement of nuanced sexual misconduct possible in the #MeToo era. 
 41. See Jia Tolentino, One Year of #MeToo:  What Women’s Speech Is Still Not Allowed 
to Do, NEW YORKER (Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/one-
year-of-metoo-what-womens-speech-is-still-not-allowed-to-do [https://perma.cc/8L4N-
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producing both grim calls to arms42 and reflections on the new varieties of 
discourse that the movement has engendered.43 
The latter variety of analysis showcases the grey-area behaviors that would 
have been emphatically categorized as trivial before #MeToo.44  In 
September 2018, Rebecca Traister wrote that the story told by Deborah 
Ramirez when she came forward during Brett Kavanaugh’s Supreme Court 
confirmation hearings was 
the kind of encounter most women I know have always assumed they’d 
never be able to recount in public—least of all in the midst of a highly 
scrutinized, high-stakes political battle—because it didn’t meet the 
impossibly high standards the world has set for women who’ve been abused 
or assaulted and want to be believed.45 
Ms. Ramirez had described a night of drinking at Yale in which, though she 
did not remember everything that occurred, she remembered her classmate, 
Mr. Kavanaugh, “pulling down his pants and thrusting his penis in her face 
against her will.”46 
Ms. Traister focused on the “patchiness” of Ms. Ramirez’s memory and 
narrative, namely on her willingness to come forward with an optically 
imperfect story and society’s newfound willingness to listen.  While this 
focus gives due credit to a monumental social development catalyzed by 
#MeToo,47 there is an equally important facet of Ms. Ramirez’s experience 
on which the piece does not focus.48  The act alleged—Mr. Kavanaugh 
exposed himself to Ms. Ramirez against her will, using enough force to 
prompt her choice of the word “thrust” in her description of the encounter,49 
but no more—is not necessarily a form of sexual assault or even 
unambiguously a crime.  Depending on jurisdictional norms, it might qualify 
as indecent exposure, criminalized lewd behavior, or lewd touching,50 but, 
 
TK3T] (“Th[e] revanchism is not a sign of #MeToo’s overcorrection, or even of its success—
it is merely evidence of its existence.”). 
 42. See, e.g., id. 
 43. See, e.g., Traister, supra note 4. 
 44. See id. 
 45. Id. (noting further that the likely lack of legal or political resolution to Ms. Ramirez’s 
allegations was in a sense beside the point when compared to the public airing of the kind of 
narrative presented by Ms. Ramirez). 
 46. Id. 
 47. See id. 
 48. See id.  Ms. Traister is admirably focused on Ms. Ramirez’s experience and the 
qualities of her narrative:  “But part of what #MeToo has always been about—despite the 
obsessive focus on the consequences faced by men—is what happened to the women . . . .  It’s 
been about the exposure of their realities.” Id.  In a somewhat contrasting approach, this Note 
posits that the type of misconduct experienced is also essential to “what happened to the 
women,” even though it describes the actions of the perpetrators. 
 49. Ronan Farrow & Jane Mayer, Senate Democrats Investigate a New Allegation of 
Sexual Misconduct, from Brett Kavanaugh’s College Years, NEW YORKER (Sept. 23, 2018), 
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/senate-democrats-investigate-a-new-allegation-
of-sexual-misconduct-from-the-supreme-court-nominee-brett-kavanaughs-college-years-
deborah-ramirez [https://perma.cc/RPC7-7C64]. 
 50. Ms. Ramirez said that she touched Mr. Kavanaugh’s penis without her consent as she 
pushed him away. Id. 
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given the ostensibly friendly and relaxed context of a college gathering, it is 
at best difficult to classify. 
Reporting this grey-area bad behavior at all is as new to public discourse 
as entertaining an imperfect narrative like the one presented by Ms. Ramirez.  
Prior to #MeToo, women justifiably worried that their actual rapes and 
assaults would appear insufficiently credible under public scrutiny; behavior 
outside of those categories, and plenty inside them, fell into the range of 
stories that women simply were expected not to tell.51 
Two other examples also typify such grey-area behaviors but occurred too 
early in the series of #MeToo accusations that began in October 2017 to 
immediately receive the kind of lensing that Ms. Traister applied to Ms. 
Ramirez’s accusations as they occurred.  In November 2017, comedian Louis 
C.K.52 and then-Senator Al Franken53 were accused, respectively, of 
masturbating in front of female colleagues and forcibly kissing and groping 
a female colleague.  The women involved—a group of women made 
accusations simultaneously in Louis C.K.’s case, while initially only 
newscaster Leeann Tweeden came forward in Mr. Franken’s case—did not 
suggest that either man had assaulted them in the traditionally understood 
sense. 
The Louis C.K. accusations in particular were notable in that they did not 
involve any physical force at all, and at least one of the women concerned 
had felt obliged to consent to the behavior at the time.54  Two of Louis C.K.’s 
accusers, comedians Dana Min Goodman and Julia Wolov, described to the 
New York Times their feeling that he had done something to them that ought 
to have consequences but seemed unlikely to be criminal.55  After Louis C.K. 
took off his clothes and masturbated in front of them in a hotel room in 2002 
(at which time their careers were beginning to take off), they attempted to 
build outrage within their profession by telling colleagues about his 
behavior.56  Ms. Wolov and Ms. Goodman felt that those they told were 
either unreceptive or constrained by Louis C.K.’s power in the industry.57  
The two comedians began avoiding the many projects to which Louis C.K. 
and his manager Dave Becky were connected after Mr. Becky told the 
women’s managers that he wanted them to stop telling others about the 
encounter.58  Fifteen years later, Ms. Wolov and Ms. Goodman felt that 
#MeToo had provided them with an opportunity, as well as a responsibility, 
 
 51. See Traister, supra note 4. 
 52. See Melena Ryzik, Cara Buckley & Jodi Kantor, Louis C.K. Is Accused by 5 Women 
of Sexual Misconduct, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/09/ 
arts/television/louis-ck-sexual-misconduct.html [https://perma.cc/RL9K-QZRP]. 
 53. See Nicholas Fandos, Al Franken Issues Apology After Accusation of Forcible Kissing 
and Groping, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/16/us/politics/ 
al-franken-sexual-harassment-groping-forcible-kissing.html [https://perma.cc/F6XU-9F3U]. 
 54. See Ryzik et al., supra note 52. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
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to speak.59  Their decision to do so helped to change the terms of what 
constituted an acceptable #MeToo subject.  Only a week separated their 
accusations from Ms. Tweeden’s, which itself altered not only the acceptable 
content but the vocabulary of the movement.60 
Following numerous additional allegations of groping, Mr. Franken 
resigned from the Senate.61  Recriminations were quick to follow his 
resignation,62 and Mr. Franken himself did little to afford his departure a 
sense of finality or fairness.63  Louis C.K. disappeared from the public stage 
for approximately ten months before performing a surprise set at the Comedy 
Cellar in New York City.64  He was greeted with a standing ovation before 
the set began.65  Reportedly, he told a joke about rape whistles.66  When 
approached for comment, the club’s owner essentially threw up his hands: 
This has been very hard for us.  We know that it is not right that he shouldn’t 
be able to perform again, but there is no clear time to decide how long is 
appropriate.  He showed up and now we’re thrown into it and we hope it 
turns out OK.67 
B.  #MeToo Challenges 
Because the #MeToo movement strives to hold accountable the 
perpetrators of noncriminal behaviors, it struggles with a dearth of acceptable 
consequences.68  Banishment from public life is a recurring suggestion69 and 
arguably is the prevailing thrust of the attempts at “consequences” made thus 
far in the lifespan of #MeToo.  Nevertheless, efforts to banish offenders 
 
 59. See id. 
 60. See Fandos, supra note 53.  Prior to Ms. Tweeden’s accusation, “forcible kissing” was 
not a phrase in common parlance.  After her accusation, it became a subject of public debate. 
See, e.g., Crystal Marie Fleming (@alwaystheself), TWITTER (May 4, 2018, 6:57 AM), 
http://twitter.com/alwaystheself/status/992402778181001217 [http://perma.cc/X7HZ-D6XK] 
(“There needs to be a whole #MeToo conversation that is JUST ABOUT forcible kissing as a 
form of sexual assault.  It’s widespread, enraging, disgusting and abusive and doesn’t get 
talked about nearly enough.”). 
 61. Helaine Olen, Stop Second-Guessing Al Franken’s Resignation.  He Has to Go, WASH. 
POST (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2017/12/19/ 
stop-second-guessing-al-frankens-resignation-he-has-to-go/ [https://perma.cc/LQ58-WQU4]. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See Molly Ball, Al Franken Is Not Sorry, TIME (Dec. 9, 2017), http://time.com/ 
5057462/al-franken-resignation-sorry/ [https://perma.cc/SJL7-UFXN]. 
 64. Clarisse Loughrey, Louis CK Tells ‘Rape Whistle’ Joke in First Stand-Up Set Since 
Sexual Misconduct Admission, INDEPENDENT (Aug. 30, 2018), http://www.independent.co.uk/ 
arts-entertainment/comedy/news/louis-ck-rape-whistle-joke-new-york-comedy-cellar-set-
sexual-misconduct-a8514031.html [http://perma.cc/Y283-92M2]. 
 65. Traister, supra note 16. 
 66. Loughrey, supra note 64. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See generally Baker, supra note 1. 
 69. Id. 
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whose acts do not rise to the level of criminal behavior have tested the 
collective American70 attention span and found it wanting.71 
The movement’s struggle with consequences also has alienated some 
observers.  Perceptions of #MeToo as a witch hunt or an indiscriminate panic 
have run the gamut from the rough-hewn72 to the relatively rigorous.73  
Tacitly uniting these criticisms is the unsettling idea that any man is 
vulnerable at any time.  If no one knows what will happen to offenders or 
even what behaviors count as offenses, it becomes easy to dismiss #MeToo—
and especially the new grey range that it has exposed—as a “mania.”74  A 
Harvey Weinstein’s behavior (or some overtly criminal subset of it) is 
capable of producing a defined resolution if not a fully satisfactory one.75  At 
present, a Louis C.K.’s behavior76 is not. 
Tarana Burke77 has characterized the movement in its present form as 
“lost.”78  Her central criticism is that #MeToo has been too focused on 
perpetrators to the detriment of survivors of sexual violence.79  As of this 
writing, she plans to build a three-pronged program geared toward #MeToo’s 
rape and sexual assault survivors.80  Ms. Burke’s solution to the #MeToo 
lacuna that she identifies is not itself a legal one, but it is one suited to coexist 
with legal mechanisms already in place81 and arguably made the more 
necessary by the adversarial criminal justice system’s lack of survivor-
centric resources.82  It is also (rightly, given Ms. Burke’s experiences and 
expertise) a #MeToo response that does not focus on the newly identified 
 
 70. #MeToo has an international dimension, but this Note discusses it as a primarily 
American phenomenon for purposes of scope. 
 71. See, e.g., Traister, supra note 16. 
 72. See, e.g., Metoo’d, URB. DICTIONARY, https://www.urbandictionary.com/ 
define.php?term=Metoo%27d [https://perma.cc/5WD5-QBCY] (last visited Feb. 12, 2019) 
(listing, as of this Note’s publication, the top definition of the term as, “When a woman Ruins 
Your Life by accusing you of sexual assault or sexual harassment without any evidence or 
pass [sic] the time that any evidence could be collected”). 
 73. See, e.g., Andrew Sullivan, It’s Time to Resist the Excesses of #MeToo, 
INTELLIGENCER (Jan. 12, 2018), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/01/andrew-sullivan-
time-to-resist-excesses-of-metoo.html [https://perma.cc/SVY3-FLLQ]. 
 74. See id. 
 75. See Maria Puente, Judge Rules Harvey Weinstein Sexual Assault Case Can Move 
Forward to Trial, USA TODAY (Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/ 
life/2018/12/20/harvey-weinstein-court-new-york-sex-crimes-charges-judge/2294182002/ 
[https://perma.cc/F8SH-86WD]. 
 76. See Ryzik et al., supra note 52. 
 77. See Garcia, supra note 18. 
 78. See Liz Rowley, The Architect of #MeToo Says the Movement Has Lost Its Way, CUT 
(Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.thecut.com/2018/10/tarana-burke-me-too-founder-movement-
has-lost-its-way.html [https://perma.cc/8YQM-NJ8Z]. 
 79. Ms. Burke’s pre-#MeToo Me Too campaign involved “healing circles” for survivors 
of sexual violence.  The circles were survivor-only support circles based on sharing 
experiences. See id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. The ethos and to some extent the form of Ms. Burke’s response also dovetails well 
with this Note’s proposed grey-area solution despite the latter’s legal character. See infra Part 
III.A.2. 
 82. This is not to imply that the adversarial criminal justice system as it exists ought to be 
survivor-centric. See infra note 104. 
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grey range of misconduct.  Given the ambiguous and uneven consequences 
currently experienced by grey-area victims and offenders alike, a clear legal 
solution that incorporates both parties is both more appropriate and more 
necessary in the grey range than it would be in response to sexual violence.83 
As #MeToo stands presently, grey-area offenders’ return from nebulous 
banishments—sometimes greeted by apparent acclaim and relief—produces 
frustration among commentators and observers of the movement.84  Some 
have suggested restorative justice as a possible way forward,85 but the legal 
contours of that solution thus far have lacked clarity. 
II.  ILLUMINATING EXTANT RESTORATIVE MODELS 
This Part considers the use of indigenous legal models by outsiders.  It 
then fleshes out current incarnations of some of those models as well as 
models based on them.  In so doing, it lays the jurisprudential foundation for 
the legal solution to grey-area #MeToo misconduct that Part III advocates. 
A.  Some Thoughts on Outsiders’ Use of Restorative Justice 
In her 1997 remarks “Lessons from the Third Sovereign:  Indian Tribal 
Courts,” Justice Sandra Day O’Connor called for the American state and 
federal court systems to take notice of and draw on the restorative justice 
practices of tribal court systems.86  She spoke of “traditional tribal values” in 
somewhat general terms.87  She also mentioned that by the 1934 passage of 
the Indian Reorganization Act, “most tribes had only a dim memory of 
traditional dispute resolution systems” and therefore had to work to 
incorporate traditional features into the tribal court systems that they set up 
following the Act’s passage.88 
Justice O’Connor’s commentary is instructive in part because—with great 
respect for her scholarship and wider aims—it falls into a number of the traps 
that the work of white scholars tends to fall into when discussing tribal courts 
and restorative justice.  For instance, while it uses specific examples,89 it 
treats tribal communities’ experiences as largely equivalent to one another.90  
 
 83. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 84. See Traister, supra note 16. 
 85. See Baker, supra note 1. 
 86. Sandra Day O’Connor, Lessons from the Third Sovereign:  Indian Tribal Courts, 33 
TULSA L.J. 1, 3–6 (1997). 
 87. Id. at 2. 
 88. Id. at 1–2. 
 89. Id. at 4. 
 90. Id. (“[R]elatively few civil disputes were decided [by tribal courts].  This disparity 
might reflect the time and expense required for civil cases, the courts’ reluctance to handle 
civil cases because of a lack of familiarity or advanced legal training, or perhaps may have 
arisen because tribal courts serve a less litigious community.  Development of alternative 
methods of dispute resolution allows the tribal courts to take advantage of their strengths in 
order to provide efficient and fair resolution of such conflicts.”). 
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And in discussing tribal courts’ strengths, it assumes that those strengths and 
the values underlying them are monolithic.91 
As this Note turns to a discussion of contemporary indigenous restorative 
justice practices and restorative justice practices inspired by the work of 
indigenous people, it does not escape these pitfalls.  Like Justice O’Connor’s 
remarks, what follows draws on a combination of specific examples and 
generalized principles and values.92  What it can and should also do is pause 
over the connection between the kitchen-sink qualities of the contemporary 
restorative justice umbrella93 and the history of American violence—
legislative and literal—against the various communities whose jurisprudence 
and values present-day outsiders often aggregate by default. 
Justice O’Connor mentioned the “enormous disruptions in customary 
Native American life . . . wrought by factors such as forced migration, 
settlement on the reservations, the allotment system, and the imposition of 
unfamiliar Anglo-American institutions,” but in the same breath, she 
discussed the Indian Reorganization Act in a remarkably positive light.94  
While it is accurate that passage of the Act to some degree “allowed the tribes 
to organize their governments, by drafting their own constitutions, adopting 
their own laws through tribal councils, and setting up their own court 
systems,”95 it is also the case that the Act, as ultimately passed, curtailed 
tribal sovereignty because Congress intended that it should.96  To the extent 
that the practices of “traditional Indian fora for dispute resolution” have been 
lost or homogenized,97 American legislative and judicial interventions have 
contributed to that loss and homogenization in what often has been a 
concerted effort to weaken indigenous culture and erode tribal autonomy.98 
Of course, Justice O’Connor’s position on these broader cultural forces in 
some sense is not the point.  She saw the appeal of various tribal 
jurisprudences, regarded tribal courts’ restorative justice practices with 
respect, and hoped that the state and federal court systems could learn from 
 
 91. Id. at 3 (“To further these traditional Native American values, tribal courts may 
employ inclusive discussion and creative problem-solving.  The focus on traditional values in 
contemporary circumstances has permitted tribal courts to conceive of alternatives to 
conventional adversarial processes.”). 
 92. It also draws on them from an unequivocal outsider’s perspective.  I am a white 
woman and have no direct experience of the practices outlined here. 
 93. See Shailly Agnihotri & Cassie Veach, Reclaiming Restorative Justice:  An Alternate 
Paradigm for Justice, 20 CUNY L. REV. 323, 326 (2017). 
 94. O’Connor, supra note 86, at 1. 
 95. Id. 
 96. L. Scott Gould, The Consent Paradigm:  Tribal Sovereignty at the Millennium, 96 
COLUM. L. REV. 809, 832–33 (1996) (“If anything, the legislative history suggests that 
Congress specifically considered and rejected a scheme of broad-based tribal sovereignty over 
territory.”). 
 97. O’Connor, supra note 86, at 2. 
 98. See, e.g., Ann Tweedy, The Liberal Forces Driving the Supreme Court’s Divestment 
and Debasement of Tribal Sovereignty, 18 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 147, 164 (2000) (parsing the 
extent to which superimposing Anglo-American ideas of land ownership onto disputes 
involving tribal sovereignty and property can abrogate the rights of tribes to self-determine, 
even in the name of ostensibly liberal values). 
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tribal courts and incorporate aspects of their approaches.  Similarly, this Note 
proposes an application of restorative justice to a context outside of 
indigenous culture.  As many nonindigenous practitioners have seen, 
restorative justice models are effective legal tools; practitioners have every 
reason to want to borrow and adapt them.  But it is this Note’s position that 
in 2019, the context—reflection on what will be borrowed, from whom, and 
the implications of the borrowing against a backdrop of centuries of cultural 
assault on indigenous people—ought always to precede the borrowing. 
B.  Structures and Applications of Restorative Justice Models 
Based on Indigenous Jurisprudence 
Modern restorative justice models and the terms used to describe them 
vary, but a set of characteristics is common to many.  Typically, they are 
nonhierarchical.99  Many of them are circle-based,100 meaning that a group 
of participants sits together in a circle, usually with a facilitator, and all 
parties have opportunities to speak.101  Values reflected in the use of a circle 
include equality102 and a sense that a given proceeding will not be resolved 
in any predetermined manner.103 
Contrast with adversarial justice systems is stark.  Though attempts have 
been made to incorporate other perspectives into the American criminal 
justice system,104 it is by design a two-power system that pits defendants 
against the government.105  Goals in the criminal justice system are largely 
retributive, and the system is not built to interrogate root causes.106  In 
general, repairing relationships and searching for the sources of behavior are 
 
 99. See, e.g., Agnihotri & Veach, supra note 93, at 327. 
 100. Many, but by no means all.  Victim-offender mediation and community boards both 
fall outside of the circle model but are sometimes categorized as restorative justice practices. 
See id. at 328–29 (distinguishing these models from circle-based models for purposes of 
establishing the authors’ working definition of restorative justice). 
 101. See, e.g., id. at 327. 
 102. Gender equality in particular was reflected in precolonial indigenous jurisprudential 
models. See SARAH DEER, THE BEGINNING AND END OF RAPE:  CONFRONTING SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE IN NATIVE AMERICA 16–17 (2015) (citing a Mvskoke rape law, written down in 
English in 1825, that makes reference to rape survivors with the phrase “what she say it be 
law”). 
 103. See Agnihotri & Veach, supra note 93, at 327 (noting the facilitator’s lack of 
predetermined agenda for a given matter’s resolution and analogizing the circle to a vessel 
capable of containing various emotions and modes of discourse). 
 104. See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, In Defense of Victim Impact Statements, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. 
L. 611, 612–16 (2009) (detailing the rise of the crime victims’ rights movement, the support 
that the movement garnered for a victims’ rights addition to the Sixth Amendment, and the 
sweeping statutory gains that the movement achieved after that bid failed).  Out of concern for 
defendants’ due process rights, this Note does not advocate increasing victims’ power in the 
adversarial system as it presently exists. 
 105. Agnihotri & Veach, supra note 93, at 329. 
 106. See Susan J. Butterwick et al., Tribal Court Peacemaking, 94 MICH. B.J. 34, 36 
(2015). 
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not part of the adversarial process.107  Rates of recidivism are concomitantly 
high.108 
Recidivism rates in the wake of Peacemaking, a form of restorative justice 
based in Navajo jurisprudence, are shockingly low.109  During a two-year 
study focused on domestic violence on the Navajo Reservation, the 
recidivism rate for Peacemaking participants was between 15 percent and 20 
percent.110  For study participants who went through the adversarial model 
and served a prison term, it was approximately 70 percent over one year.111  
Other tribes using the Peacemaking model have also experienced excellent 
outcomes:  the Alaskan Kake tribe measured the results of Peacemaking over 
the course of four years and found a 97.5 percent success rate in sentence 
fulfillment.112 
As practiced by Navajos themselves, Peacemaking113 in particular is 
diametrically opposed to the American adversarial justice system in both 
method and ethos.114  A central tenet underlying the process is that the vast 
majority of people are not fundamentally evil, no matter the acts that they 
have committed.115  According to the Navajo conception of justice, labeling 
those who have acted wrongly as criminals or abusers—even as defendants—
would be needlessly stigmatizing and is irrelevant to the Peacemaking 
process; there is no word for punishment in the Navajo language.116 
Labeling is an embedded feature of the American system.117  In a typical 
criminal justice context, defendants either experience the nearly ubiquitous 
plea-bargaining process118 or opt at trial to exercise their periodically debated 
privilege against self-incrimination.119  Thus, people accused of crimes often 
 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Interview 1 with Eric Gross, supra note 17.  Mr. Gross’s grant funded his work from 
1996 to 1998, though his affiliation with the Peacemaking Division of the Navajo Nation 
Judicial Branch continued for several years thereafter.  The purpose of the grant was to assess 
the effectiveness of Navajo Peacemaking in reducing recidivism in the area of domestic 
violence specifically.  Therefore, the study focused in part on cases that would have gone to 
family court in the absence of a Peacemaking option.  However, Mr. Gross also observed 
Peacemaking proceedings that took place as an alternative to criminal proceedings, and his 
study tracked individuals whose cases were adjudicated through the criminal justice system. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Butterwick et al., supra note 106, at 35. 
 113. The process has another name in the Navajo language, but Navajo practitioners prefer 
not to share it outside of their own people and use the word “Peacemaking” when speaking to 
non-Navajos. Interview 2 with Eric Gross, supra note 17. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. See Butterwick et al., supra note 106, at 36. 
 118. See, e.g., Emily Yoffe, Innocence Is Irrelevant, ATLANTIC (Sept. 15, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/09/innocence-is-irrelevant/534171/ 
[https://perma.cc/QH9L-RHWZ] (“The vast majority of felony convictions are now the result 
of plea bargains—some 94 percent at the state level, and some 97 percent at the federal level. 
Estimates for misdemeanor convictions run even higher.”). 
 119. See, e.g., Jeffrey Bellin, Reconceptualizing the Fifth Amendment Prohibition of 
Adverse Comment on Criminal Defendants’ Trial Silence, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 229, 285–86 
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either remain entirely silent in the courtroom or are compelled to verbally 
admit guilt and say nothing more, in exchange for a reduced sentence.120  
Thereafter, they are assigned a new label:  criminal, felon, convict, inmate.121  
The Peacemaking model, by contrast, is constructed around an idea that 
hearing and validating the experience of the offender is an important step on 
the road to reaching an outcome that restores a positive relationship among 
the parties involved in a conflict and prevents future offenses.122 
Though notoriously difficult to describe in detail,123 a Navajo 
Peacemaking might go like this124:  A young man breaks his mother’s jaw in 
a drunken rage.  The mother asks for a Peacemaking.  The son agrees.  Before 
the Peacemaking, the facilitator asks the mother not to mention her broken 
jaw.  The broken jaw is heavily bandaged; its existence is visible and known.  
The Peacemaking takes place in a circle.  Present are the mother, the son, the 
son’s father, the son’s girlfriend, and the facilitator, a traditional counselor.  
The facilitator asks the mother to speak.  She speaks for as long as she wants 
to.  Mostly, she shares memories of her son’s childhood.  During the time 
that she speaks, the son covers his face with his hands and sobs.  She looks 
directly at him the whole time.  The father speaks next.  The girlfriend speaks 
after the father.  This has all taken about two hours.  The facilitator tells the 
son that it is now his turn to speak.  The son also speaks for as long as he 
wants to.  Among other things, he tells his mother that the day of the 
Peacemaking will be his first day as a new person.  When he is done speaking, 
the facilitator asks the mother and son how they would like to resolve their 
conflict.  The son says that he wants his mother to write the Peacemaking 
agreement and that he will be guided by what she says.  She writes an 
agreement that they both sign.  Among its provisions is her hope that he will 
visit home more.  The facilitator concludes the Peacemaking.  During the two 
years that his case is tracked, the son never reoffends. 
More broadly, Navajo Peacemaking is built in practice around equal 
opportunities to speak.125  A facilitator—typically a traditional counselor or 
healer—is always present in a nonleadership role to ensure that all parties 
speak to one another, sometimes for several hours.126  Participants are 
encouraged to speak from the heart, but, as in the foregoing example, in some 
contexts a given participant may be asked before the Peacemaking to refrain 
from making direct reference to the harm or violent act that necessitated the 
 
(2010) (advocating alterations to the constitutional rule prohibiting adverse comment by the 
government on criminal defendants’ silence on grounds that it is doctrinally precarious). 
 120. Interview 2 with Eric Gross, supra note 17. 
 121. See Butterwick et al., supra note 106, at 36. 
 122. Interview 2 with Eric Gross, supra note 17. 
 123. Peacemaking and related jurisprudential models are built to adapt to a given set of 
circumstances; they are difficult to describe because they are fluid by design. See Donna 
Coker, Enhancing Autonomy for Battered Women:  Lessons from Navajo Peacemaking, 47 
UCLA L. REV. 1, 36 (1999). 
 124. The following is an anonymized account of a Peacemaking observed during Mr. 
Gross’s study. Interview 2 with Eric Gross, supra note 17. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
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Peacemaking.127  Though not ubiquitous, this aspect of Peacemaking is an 
example of elements that may appear jarring when one’s frame of reference 
is the American criminal justice system.128  In the criminal justice framework 
and across the adversarial model in general, accusations are evidence-based, 
and demonstration of harm to the factfinder is central to any possible 
resolution.129  In Peacemaking, the harm is known and visible without having 
additional attention drawn to it.130  What is important is creating a forum 
conducive to mending the relationship among the parties.131  When an 
agreement is reached, it is reached by the parties and originates with them in 
the context of speaking to one another and experiencing one another’s 
emotional responses.132  It is never superimposed by authorities with an 
agenda external to the dispute or harm.133  According to Navajo Peacemaking 
practitioners, this legal model134 is based on human nature.135  Traditional 
counselors take the position that Peacemaking is not the Navajo way; it is 
justice.136 
As such, in the hands of careful practitioners, Peacemaking principles can 
be adapted for use outside of tribal settings.137  Washtenaw County, 
Michigan, for example, has successfully operated a Peacemaking Court on 
its docket since the fall of 2013.138  It is the first state court project of its kind 
and receives funding from the Michigan Supreme Court, premised on the 
idea that “tribal peacemaking principles [can] be successfully applied in state 
court proceedings to resolve cases, increase satisfaction of litigants, and 
 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Indeed, from the perspective of the Peacemaking ethos, a legal model that necessitates 
drawing undue attention to and proving the harm such that the claims of the victim must be 
put to the test and defended is itself counterproductive because it is revictimizing rather than 
caring. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Instinctually, those accustomed to adversarial justice sometimes view Peacemaking 
and other forms of restorative justice as legally illegitimate or incomplete rather than simply 
as an unfamiliar legal model of conflict resolution and harm amelioration.  Compounding the 
tendency of adversarial practitioners to see nonadversarial models as doctrinally suspect 
(because they are nonretributive) or lacking in deterrent force (because they are nonpunitive) 
is the fact that Peacemaking maintains a particularly unfamiliar set of values with respect to 
outcome:  “The goal of Peacemaking is to restore ‘good feelings’ among disputants.  This 
doesn’t necessarily mean to [award] ‘damages’ or make good on broken promises, although it 
might mean that.  The details are unimportant.  What is important is the quality of the 
interpersonal feelings.” Id.  To the adversarial purist, this framework can be difficult to 
fathom.  Though this Note emphatically regards restorative justice practices as a legitimate 
alternative legal model (and though these practices are regularly used in contexts where they 
carry legal force and produce outcomes that surpass the success rates of adversarial practices), 
its proposal does not require that the adversarial-model-trained skeptic accept restorative 
justice as a wholesale substitute for the adversarial system but rather as an effective 
supplement in a limited context. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Butterwick et al., supra note 106, at 34. 
2019] THE LIGHT WE SHINE INTO THE GREY 1711 
improve public trust in justice.”139  The Peacemaking Court began by taking 
referrals, including civil, family, and probate cases, and has since expanded 
to handle juvenile abuse and neglect dockets and newly filed cases across its 
purview.140  In practice, the court makes use of traditional circles,141 
sometimes including family members and other supporters of those directly 
involved in a dispute.142  The court also uses circles in pre- and post-
proceeding contexts to fortify connections and gains developed during the 
Peacemaking itself.143 
Another model using techniques similar144 to Navajo Peacemaking is the 
Hollow Water Community Holistic Circle Healing process, begun in the 
Hollow Water community in Canada in response to rampant sexual abuse 
and assault.145  The model is based on Ojibwa jurisprudence and makes use 
of a multistep process involving a series of Peacemaking-like circles, which 
take place in the wake of a guilty plea before a judge.146  The Hollow Water 
program, especially the initial circle, stresses helping the offender to accept 
and communicate responsibility for his actions.147  In subsequent circles, he 
is able to sit with and hear the survivor of his offense in order to begin to 
understand his actions in the context of their impact on her life.148  Later 
circles can include the families of the offender and of the survivor so that the 
presence of both communities is incorporated into the offender’s 
understanding of his actions and acceptance of responsibility, and so that the 
survivor has a support network present.149 
By the numbers, the Hollow Water process is successful:  in a study by the 
Native Counseling Service of Alberta, only two offenders out of sixty-five 
who completed the program were charged with subsequent sexual offenses 
over a two-year period.150  This result reflects the degree to which 
Peacemaking-type models are well suited to offenses involving intimate 
relationships and emotionally fraught harms.151  Family conflicts are an ideal 
 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Mr. Gross noted that right angles are disfavored in Navajo culture because Navajos 
tend to prefer the nonhierarchal symbolism of circles. Interview 2 with Eric Gross, supra note 
17. 
 142. Butterwick et al., supra note 106, at 37. 
 143. See id. at 36. 
 144. Interview 2 with Eric Gross, supra note 17. 
 145. Jessica Metoui, Comment, Returning to the Circle:  The Reemergence of Traditional 
Dispute Resolution in Native American Communities, 2007 J. DISP. RESOL. 517, 531–32 (“In 
1994, the Hollow Water Community Holistic Circle Healing . . . team estimated that three out 
of four members of the Hollow Water community had been victims of sexual abuse and that 
one in three members of the community had been an abuser.”). 
 146. Because it follows a plea, the Hollow Water method demonstrates a version of 
restorative justice that coexists with some of the familiar features of the adversarial model. 
See id. at 532. 
 147. Id. at 533.  This Note, like Ms. Metoui’s Comment, speaks in general terms of male 
offenders and female survivors, but of course, other gender combinations are possible. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 534. 
 151. Interview 1 with Eric Gross, supra note 17. 
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construct because of the emotional investment typically present within a 
family unit, but the Hollow Water program suggests that sexual offenses also 
fall into the category of intimate wrongs for which Peacemaking is an 
effective model for redress and resolution.152  That said, application of 
Peacemaking methods to violent sexual offenses is not without its critics.153  
As this Note discusses in Part III, when searching for solutions and 
consequences in the aftermath of sexual harms, there is good reason to 
differentiate between sexual harms at the violent end of the spectrum and 
harms that instead constitute a grey area of behavior.  This latter category 
encompasses behaviors newly visible under the #MeToo aegis.154 
III.  LIGHTING THE WAY FORWARD 
This Part lays out a proposed legal response to grey-area #MeToo 
misconduct that uses a modified restorative justice framework based on 
Peacemaking principles and practices.  It then reflects on the limits of what 
the #MeToo movement, and this Note’s proposal, can do for Native 
American women. 
A.  Restorative Justice in a Limited #MeToo Context 
Restorative justice models like Peacemaking work—as demonstrated by a 
sense of resolution, satisfaction, and justice among participants,155 as well as 
high rates of sentence fulfillment156 and low rates of recidivism157—because 
through Peacemaking offenders come to understand their actions in the 
context of their own lives and the lives of those that they have affected.158  
To the extent that #MeToo is not working—to the extent that it has broken 
new ground in cultural discourse159 but left those affected searching for 
consequences and next steps160—it has stalled because it lacks a sense of 
resolution, satisfaction, and justice for those involved as well as any means 
of assuring that offenders understand their actions and will not continue 
exactly as before after an indeterminate period of social banishment.161  
Restorative justice provides a workable way forward162 in the wake of the 
grey-area misconduct that #MeToo has exposed but to which no uniform 
solution currently exists. 
 
 152. Interview 2 with Eric Gross, supra note 17. 
 153. See, e.g., DEER, supra note 102, at 128–33. 
 154. See supra Part I.A. 
 155. See, e.g., Butterwick et al., supra note 106, at 34. 
 156. See, e.g., id. at 35. 
 157. Interview 1 with Eric Gross, supra note 17. 
 158. See, e.g., Metoui, supra note 145, at 533. 
 159. See, e.g., Traister, supra note 4. 
 160. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 1. 
 161. See id. 
 162. See id. 
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1.  Why a Limited Context 
There are several reasons that this Note does not propose restorative justice 
solutions outside of grey-area #MeToo misconduct.  First, rape and sexual 
assault have a defined range of consequences in the criminal justice system.  
This Note does not take the position that those consequences or that system 
are perfect in either theory or execution—merely that they already exist.  
Second, restorative justice models that do not differentiate between sexual 
violence and other forms of sexual misconduct face justifiable criticism.  In 
her critique of the Hollow Water program,163 Professor Sarah Deer has 
argued that for rape survivors in particular, many of the offender-centric 
practices that characterize the model are potentially revictimizing for 
survivors.164  In particular, the degree to which offenders’ understanding of 
their actions’ impact is predicated on an exposure of survivors’ pain makes 
survivors responsible for offenders’ healing to a troubling extent.165  
Professor Deer suggests that Peacemaking’s de-emphasis on fact-finding and 
lack of mechanism to confront consistent denials run the risk of exposing a 
rape survivor’s pain and producing no accountability to justify the 
exposure.166  She also worries that in the limited set of cases in which a 
perpetrator does reoffend following a Peacemaking, the demoralizing effect 
on a rape survivor who participated in a failed circle would be acute.167  
These concerns are legitimate.  They are also typical of the critique that 
prevents the widespread use of Peacemaking models notwithstanding their 
effectiveness.  In order both to respect the rights and wishes of rape and 
assault survivors and to advocate the use of Peacemaking techniques in a 
context well suited to those techniques’ strengths, this Note aligns with 
Professor Deer’s position on violent sexual crimes.  It does not suggest 
restorative justice for the Harvey Weinsteins exposed by the #MeToo 
movement. 
Finally, the very newness168 of grey-area allegations presents a context in 
which a novel legal solution is not only warranted but also possible.  The 
hunger for consequences and next steps engendered by #MeToo has not come 
from a single group or political party.  Rather, the commentary from largely 
progressive-leaning columnists169 can be read to seek the same thing that 
President Trump presumably sought when he noted that the fall of 2018 was 
a “very scary time for young men in America.”170  Both viewpoints express 
a yearning for stability, for a framework that conveys to men and women that 
there can be justice and a clearly delineated way forward following 
 
 163. See Metoui, supra note 145, at 533. 
 164. DEER, supra note 102, at 130. 
 165. Id. at 129. 
 166. Id. at 133. 
 167. Id. at 132–33. 
 168. See Traister, supra note 4. 
 169. See, e.g., Jessica Bennett, The #MeToo Moment:  What’s Next?, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/05/us/the-metoo-moment-whats-next.html 
[https://perma.cc/R22H-62NC]. 
 170. Diamond, supra note 40. 
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potentially career-ending accusations.  Hiring fewer women171 cannot be a 
long-term solution any more than banishing offenders and hoping that they 
divine the decent and correct moment to return172 can be.  Frustration and 
confusion173 are evident on all sides of the issues. 
2.  #MeToo Peacemakings 
There is ample evidence that many #MeToo offenders do not understand 
why their actions now occasion public censure.174  To a certain extent, this 
is to be expected; prior to 2017, the grey range of allegations that some 
#MeToo offenders face would have been brushed aside as inconsequential 
by offenders and victims alike.175  Though it is amply possible to take a 
blame-sharing perspective on #MeToo misconduct too far,176 American 
culture as a whole tolerated subtle bad behavior and abuses of power right up 
until the moment that it did not.  It might be argued then that Al Franken, 
Louis C.K., fired Today Show host Matt Lauer, fired CBS This Morning host 
Charlie Rose, and those whose behavior has been comparable to theirs should 
be forgiven both for their behavior and for their subsequent consternation 
because “everybody was doing it.” 
The broader cultural explicability of grey-area offenders’ befuddlement, 
however, renders a legal solution with a focus on understanding one’s actions 
more—not less—essential.  If offenders who demonstrably do not understand 
their behaviors’ impact on victims’ lives continue to experience indefinite 
 
 171. See, e.g., Jorge L. Ortiz, Will #MeToo Turn into #NotHer?:  Movement May Come 
with Unintended Workplace Consequences, USA TODAY (Oct. 4, 2018), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2018/10/04/metoo-movement-unintended-career-
consequences-women/1503516002/ [https://perma.cc/TLE9-GGZM]. 
 172. See, e.g., Loughrey, supra note 64. 
 173. Unanswered questions in grey-area cases currently include:  How bad is the 
ambiguous behavior?  Should it be forgiven?  How much public contrition does an offender 
need to demonstrate?  How long is a reasonable banishment?  Does the length depend on the 
behavior?  Does it depend on the public trust placed in the offender prior to the accusations?  
On whom he harmed and how many victims came forward?  On the size and devotion of his 
public fan base before the accusations?  Can he return to his career?  A similar career? 
 174. See, e.g., Amanda Arnold, Charlie Rose Will Reportedly Host a Show About Men 
Brought Down by #MeToo, CUT (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.thecut.com/2018/04/charlie-
rose-has-plans-to-host-a-show-about-metoo-report.html [https://perma.cc/FZ74-P9N7]; Ball, 
supra note 63; Loughrey, supra note 64; Emily Zogbi, Is Matt Lauer Planning His Television 
Comeback?, NEWSWEEK (Sept. 1, 2018), https://www.newsweek.com/matt-lauer-planning-
his-television-comeback-1101134 [https://perma.cc/Y67R-KDWE].  The behavior described 
in the foregoing articles suggests, at the very least, that these men expect to be forgiven for 
their actions and consider their returns to public life likely if not assured.  More fundamentally, 
it suggests that they do not understand why they are being “punished.” 
 175. The degree to which the kind of grey-area misconduct exposed by #MeToo previously 
was a largely invisible and thus routinely accepted element of American culture is reflected in 
vitriolic pop cultural debates like the one occasioned by “Baby, It’s Cold Outside” in 2018. 
See, e.g., Andrea Peyser, When They Go After ‘Baby It’s Cold Outside,’ You Know #MeToo 
Has Gone Mad, N.Y. POST (Dec. 4, 2018), http://nypost.com/2018/12/04/when-they-go-after-
baby-its-cold-outside-you-know-metoo-has-gone-mad/ [https://perma.cc/Q7V3-DA8N]. 
 176. See, e.g., Claire Zillman, Democratic Congresswoman Says It’s the ‘Responsibility of 
the Female’ to Prevent Sexual Harassment, FORTUNE (Oct. 19, 2017), http://fortune.com/ 
2017/10/19/sexual-harassment-women-to-blame-democrat/ [https://perma.cc/LE8Z-UPDW]. 
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banishments enforced on an ad hoc basis, many of them will wait out those 
banishments and then return to their former careers and, likely, their former 
proclivities.  This is not a doomsday scenario; on the contrary, it would be 
business as usual.  Under this outcome, #MeToo would have been a brief 
aberration in an ultimately immutable power structure that, though it may 
newly have condemned subtle and systemic trespasses, simply was not 
equipped to build long-lasting solutions. 
Grey-area misconduct exposed by and following #MeToo should be 
addressed with Peacemaking.  The Peacemaking envisioned here would not 
be necessarily identical to Navajo Peacemaking or to the Ojibwa-influenced 
Peacemaking-type model used in the Hollow Water program.  It also would 
not be identical to the Washtenaw County, Michigan, Peacemaking Court’s 
model (which refers to its practice as Peacemaking in part after the Navajo 
model).  Rather, it would be an amalgamation of some of the essential 
features of each, under a restorative justice umbrella flexible both to local 
jurisdictional needs and to the needs of individual participants.  Ideally, 
judges would be trained by indigenous practitioners, but they could also be 
trained by nonindigenous practitioners familiar with Peacemaking-type 
models in practice, such as Judge Timothy Connors in Michigan.177 
Peacemaking dockets should be attached to lower-level state courts,178 as 
Washtenaw County, Michigan, has done successfully with its Peacemaking 
docket since 2013.179  Though state court systems vary, the docket should be 
attached to whichever trial-level court generally hears civil suits in a given 
state to avoid any suggestion of criminal liability.  Peacemaking training for 
one judge per state subdivision—likely per county in most states—could be 
funded either by the state’s highest court180 or by an independent initiative 
such as Time’s Up.181 
 
 177. See Butterwick et al., supra note 106, at 34. 
 178. Anchoring the program to state courts would ensure a degree of political diversity 
among participating judges, as many state court judges are elected.  This would maximize the 
public perception of fairness, given that members of both major political parties have a 
tendency to look with suspicion on the impartiality of judges appointed by the other party. 
Compare Charlie Savage, Trump Is Rapidly Reshaping the Judiciary.  Here’s How, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/11/us/politics/trump-judiciary-
appeals-courts-conservatives.html [https://perma.cc/8Q4X-FAP3], with Thomas Jipping, On 
the Democrats’ Confirmation-Process Report, NAT’L REV. (June 7, 2018, 11:38 AM), 
https://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/republicans-stacking-courts-democrats-
claims-false/ [https://perma.cc/32TS-4DWJ]. 
 179. See Butterwick et al., supra note 106, at 34. 
 180. In Washtenaw County, the Michigan Supreme Court’s Court Performance Innovation 
Fund provides funding for the program. Id.  A similar ethos of strengthening, among other 
values, public trust in justice through nontraditional means would be important to the viability 
of this Note’s proposal. 
 181. See Natalie Robehmed, With $20 Million Raised, Time’s Up Seeks ‘Equity and Safety’ 
in the Workplace, FORBES (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
natalierobehmed/2018/02/06/with-20-million-raised-times-up-seeks-equity-and-safety-in-
the-workplace/ [https://perma.cc/QDA8-CL2E].  Time’s Up bills itself as a coalition 
committed to change across industries and seeking solutions through diverse channels.  If it 
or an initiative like it were to partially fund a grant, such a grant could in turn fund 
Peacemaking dockets as a public-private partnership without raising ethical issues. 
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Only nonviolent misconduct that did not rise to the level of criminal 
behavior would be eligible for the Peacemaking dockets.182  Conflicts would 
reach the dockets in one of two ways.  First, the victim of the misconduct 
could request a Peacemaking.  In that situation, the victim would initiate a 
claim, but the claim would proceed no further if the alleged offender did not 
agree to the Peacemaking.183  Alternately, the offender could request a 
Peacemaking, likely in response to a series of triggering events, such as a 
victim’s accusation followed by a firing or forced resignation. 
Offenders would be incentivized to request or agree to Peacemakings 
because the Peacemakings’ outcome would legally restore them to their 
preaccusation community status.  Once a Peacemaking was initiated, the 
court on whose docket the Peacemaking appeared would formally open and 
then immediately adjourn a proceeding.  Procedurally, this would resemble 
an Adjournment in Contemplation of Dismissal (ACD).184  For 
Peacemaking, the procedure would be termed an “Adjournment in 
Contemplation of Restoration” (ACR).185 
The proceeding itself would consist of three circles, taking place over the 
course of six months.186  In the first circle, the offender would sit with the 
facilitator (a judge trained in the Peacemaking model) and, once the program 
was well established, a small group of former offenders who had already 
completed Peacemakings.187  Three months later in the second circle, the 
offender would sit with the victim or victims188 and the facilitator and listen 
 
 182. Harassment prohibited or likely prohibited (in the case of especially nebulous 
misconduct) by the policies of a given workplace would qualify as long as the conduct were 
not criminal. 
 183. Navajo Peacemaking requires that all parties to a dispute formally consent to the 
process; if they do not, it cannot proceed. See DEER, supra note 102, at 129.  Under this Note’s 
proposed framework, some alleged offenders simply would not agree to a Peacemaking, and 
they would be free to decline.  This voluntary dimension is important for several reasons.  
First, it maintains fidelity to the scheme’s indigenous antecedents.  Second, it underscores the 
scheme’s operation separate from criminal process and criminal liability.  Lastly, it serves as 
a bulwark against the perception, otherwise inevitable in any #MeToo context, that it is a 
mechanism for women to pursue unjustifiable witch hunts. See supra Part I.B. 
 184. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.55(8) (2018) (“Upon the dismissal of the 
accusatory instrument . . . the arrest and prosecution shall be deemed a nullity and the 
defendant shall be restored, in contemplation of law, to the status he occupied before his arrest 
and prosecution.”). 
 185. The use of the new procedural term “Adjournment in Contemplation of Restoration” 
would serve to distinguish ACRs from ACDs and to frame the Peacemaking as a restorative 
proceeding both procedurally and by virtue of jurisprudential lineage and ethos. 
 186. During the six-month pendency of the process, the offender would be encouraged to 
avoid unnecessary exposure (if a public figure) or to seek employment outside of his former 
field (if a private citizen).  The #MeToo movement’s instinct toward banishment may be 
merely an unregulated attempt at retribution.  On the other hand, however impractical and 
undefined, it may also typify a societal instinct to send the offender away to think about what 
he has done and improve himself.  The six-month duration of a #MeToo Peacemaking would 
leave room for the positive implications of this latter impulse without allowing the 
“banishment” to go on indefinitely. 
 187. See Metoui, supra note 145, at 533. 
 188. Additional victims would be permitted to join a Peacemaking, regardless of whether 
it was initiated by a victim or by the offender.  Before a multivictim Peacemaking, the 
facilitator would meet with each victim and ask her to agree to present only her own words 
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to the victim or victims speak.  The facilitator would ensure that the offender 
also used his opportunity to speak.  In the final circle six months after the 
Peacemaking was initiated, a few members of the victim’s189 and the 
offender’s communities (in most cases, their families), would sit with 
them.190  The facilitator would again ensure that all parties spoke.  Then the 
parties—guided by the exigencies of their particular circumstances—would 
draw up and sign a memorandum of understanding, which could take any 
form that they mutually chose to conclude the Peacemaking.  The 
memorandum of understanding would remain a private document among the 
parties. 
There would exist no explicit benchmark for “success” within the 
Peacemaking itself.  What would matter, as in Navajo Peacemaking, would 
not be the form of the agreement reached but the effect of the experience as 
between the parties.191  However, there would be a mechanism by which 
success would be publicly communicated.  If the facilitator determined that 
the offender had demonstrated a good-faith effort to participate in the three 
circles and commit to the outcome chosen by the parties, the court in which 
the Peacemaking claim was initially filed would produce a “Record of 
Restoration” document to conclude the ACR.  This document would signal 
to the former offender’s community, to future employers, and—in the case 
of public figures—to the widest community aware of his actions, that he 
should be deemed eligible for restoration to the community status that he 
occupied prior to his victim’s accusations. 
Unlike criminal sanctions, Peacemaking is both nonpunitive and geared to 
enhance the understanding of the offender; it is in large part for this latter 
reason that it is successful as an alternative to adversarial criminal justice 
processes.192  It is as well suited, if not better suited, to address noncriminal 
#MeToo behaviors.  Their accusers and subsequent public condemnation 
have communicated to the likes of Louis C.K. and Al Franken that what they 
did is something we now consider to be wrong.  In no meaningful sense have 
they been told why. 
Peacemaking is built on participants listening to one another.  In part this 
is to give all parties a voice and a sense of resolution.193  In part it is so that 
the offender can begin to change the way that he views himself.194  In part 
the process is built to help each party to gain a heightened understanding of 
the other; in the case of the offender, change occurs most powerfully when 
 
and feelings.  Such limited, ex parte-type communications have a precedent in Navajo 
Peacemaking. Interview 2 with Eric Gross, supra note 17.  Victims would then speak 
sequentially during the Peacemaking itself.  For cases with accusations from more than three 
victims, additional victims would be required to initiate a separate Peacemaking naming the 
same offender. 
 189. In the case of an offender with multiple victims, the final circle could be divided into 
multiple circles over successive days in order to accommodate the victims’ communities. 
 190. See Metoui, supra note 145, at 533. 
 191. Interview 2 with Eric Gross, supra note 17. 
 192. See, e.g., Butterwick et al., supra note 106, at 35. 
 193. See id. at 34. 
 194. See Coker, supra note 123, at 56. 
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he comes to understand both the roots of his behavior195 and that behavior’s 
effect on the victim’s life.196  #MeToo Peacemaking not only would provide 
a venue and process to afford resolution to victims and communicate to 
offenders the negative effects of their actions.  It also would provide a venue 
and process to satisfactorily define grey-area harms that the #MeToo 
movement has identified but has struggled to delineate and circumscribe.197 
For grey-area offenders who declined to participate in a Peacemaking, 
nothing would change.198  The uncertainty that currently prevails in all grey-
area cases simply would linger in their cases.  However, the existence of 
Peacemakings and of Records of Restoration would incentivize participation 
because participating offenders would opt out of that uncertainty.  The 
Peacemakings’ existence also would clarify by accretion199 the contours of 
grey-area misconduct itself as well as societal expectations for offenders, 
even nonparticipating offenders.  Finally, the existence of a nonpunitive set 
of consequences for the grey range of misconduct would benefit victims by 
providing them with a meaningful resolution; offenders by affording them 
insight as well as certainty; and the public by grounding the #MeToo 
movement’s way forward in a measured, voluntary, and predictable legal 
process. 
B.  What #MeToo Peacemakings Can(not) Do 
for Native American Women 
The sexual violence experienced by indigenous women is anything but 
grey.  According to Professor Sarah Deer, in its brutality and in the social 
perceptions that it engenders, sexual violence has not changed much for 
Native American women in the past five hundred years.200  It is important to 
understand that this is so by design.201  It is also important to understand that 
 
 195. See Butterwick et al., supra note 106, at 36. 
 196. See Metoui, supra note 145, at 533. 
 197. This proposition runs the risk of sounding as if #MeToo has decided that certain 
behaviors are wrong and has not bothered to determine why.  In reality, the contours and scope 
of grey-area misconduct should be difficult to pinpoint because no mass movement has ever 
before succeeded in objecting to that misconduct.  Ideally, in a context in which offenders 
became cognizant through Peacemaking of the harms their behavior had caused, they should 
be in nearly as good a position as victims to articulate appropriate behavioral boundaries in 
the grey range.  It is my hope that—far from contributing to #MeToo detractors’ contention 
that the movement is panic-based and indiscriminately invested in demonizing all men, see, 
for example, Sullivan, supra note 73—this Note’s proposal will appeal to #MeToo proponents 
and critics alike because it will put grey-area offenders in a position to exercise informed 
agency as normative boundaries gradually are set. 
 198. Similarly, for offenders who participated in the process, obtained a Record of 
Restoration, and then reoffended, the “punishment” would be a return to the limbo currently 
experienced by all grey-area offenders (albeit with a presumable increase in reputational 
damage). 
 199. The Peacemakings would, of course, lack true binding precedential force. 
 200. Deer, supra note 15, at 458–59. 
 201. Professor Deer has highlighted four systematic developments in American federal law 
that de jure or de facto have stripped tribal governments of jurisdiction over sexual crimes 
against Native American women:  the Major Crimes Act, Public Law 280, the Indian Civil 
Rights Act, and Oliphant v. Suquamish. Id. at 460.  The combined effect of these developments 
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the colonialist underpinnings of this design are reflected not only in the 
legislative and judicial scheme that has enabled violence against Native 
American women in record numbers but also in the character of the violence 
itself.202 
Following decades of outright legal assault on Native American women’s 
autonomy,203 the current détente among federal jurisdiction, state 
jurisdiction, and tribal jurisdiction has largely abandoned them.204  More than 
indigenous women “need”205 #MeToo, they need resources, and they need to 
live within the borders of a country that both recognizes their people’s 
sovereignty and refuses to look away when—by the numbers206—the current 
systems are not working for them. 
It is possible to argue that the #MeToo movement’s recognition of new 
grey forms of sexual misconduct is trivial in comparison to the experiences 
of many indigenous women.  This Note takes the position that it is not trivial; 
it is different.  Further, the identification of a grey range of sexual misconduct 
and the development of an appropriate legal response thereto ultimately 
would benefit all women who have survived rape or sexual assault as well as 
all women who have experienced grey-area misconduct.  It would signal that 
nuanced, targeted legal recourse were available to both groups.  It also would 
signal that the American legal system were prepared to begin the work of 
validating the experiences and addressing the needs of the full spectrum of 
survivors. 
In its specific mechanics, this Note’s proposal also would create a hybrid 
jurisprudential model that could serve as a template for future collaborations 
between indigenous jurists and jurists trained in the Anglo-American model.  
The web of semiconflicting jurisdictions currently operating on tribal land 
produces an uneasy jurisprudential hybrid born of colonialism, lack of 
resources, and neglect.  The proposal outlined in Part III.A of this Note is an 
intentional jurisprudential hybrid.  Though it does not directly ameliorate 
Native American women’s dire situations with respect to sexual violence, it 
is constructed with an eye to the future.  Developing the jurisprudential 
flexibility inherent in a carefully constructed hybrid system that honors and 
amplifies tribal values is a small step down a long road.  But it is this Note’s 
 
is a jurisdictional scheme that is at best ambiguous and at worst actively contributory to an 
atmosphere of “lawlessness” in some communities on reservations. See generally Goldberg-
Ambrose, supra note 15 (drawing the direct line from legislation to lawlessness). 
 202. See DEER, supra note 102, at x. 
 203. Cases like State v. Williams, 484 P.2d 1167 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971), are a grim 
illustration of the havoc that federal policies regarding Native American children have 
wreaked in the lives of Native American women in recent history. 
 204. See, e.g., Rachel Monroe, The Delay, ESQUIRE (Apr. 18, 2018), 
https://www.esquire.com/news-politics/a19561163/ashlynne-mike-amber-alert-navajo-
reservation/ [https://perma.cc/2XEL-2KBB]; see also MaryAnne Golon, Most Sex Crimes Go 
Unpunished at this Sioux Reservation.  So These Survivors Turn to Traditional Healing, LILY 
(Apr. 15, 2018), https://www.thelily.com/most-sex-crimes-go-unpunished-at-this-sioux-
reservation-so-these-survivors-turn-to-traditional-healing/ [https://perma.cc/VP6T-LEBR]. 
 205. This Note does not seek, nor can it, to prescribe what Native American women “need” 
but rather to compare the relative urgency of various problems as externally perceived. 
 206. See ROSAY, supra note 8, at 13. 
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hope that the end of that road holds flexible and nontraditional jurisprudential 
designs that serve the needs of indigenous women without encroaching on 
indigenous sovereignty. 
CONCLUSION 
The #MeToo movement has newly publicly identified a grey category of 
sexual misconduct.  Grey-area behavior—paradigmatically, the conduct of 
an Al Franken or a Louis C.K.—is something that victims have never before 
been able to talk about without having their experiences trivialized.  As 
#MeToo stands, however, accusations of misconduct in the grey range are 
tried in the court of public opinion and “punished” by haphazardly banishing 
offenders for an undefined period.  Rather than accept this uncertainty 
indefinitely, state courts should institute Peacemaking dockets and process 
voluntary #MeToo claims with Adjournments in Contemplation of 
Restoration.  Victims would find resolution in this process.  Former offenders 
would gain both insight into their actions and a concrete legal channel 
through which to restore an earned reputational and professional stability.  
Finally, the use of indigenous jurisprudential techniques for grey-area 
claims—though it would do nothing for the sexual violence crisis faced by 
Native American women today—would be a step down the road to smart, 
hybrid jurisprudential models capable of adaptation to the needs of all three 
sovereigns. 
